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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
 This action sounds in legal malpractice and centers around the Will 
of Gordon Lanham ("Gordon"), father of the plaintiff Thomas Lanham ("Thomas"). Upon Gordon's 
death in 2013, the Will was placed into probate.' The Will, which disinherited Thomas, failed to 
devise two pieces of real property and lacked a residuary clause'. Under Idaho law, this 
circumstance creates an intestacy as to property not devised. 
Ignoring these two omissions which, plaintiff argues, created a partial intestacy to his benefit, 
the Magistrate ruled that the Will devised Gordon's estate in its entirety to Robert and Joseph 
Lanham, Gordon's grandsons: 
Decedent's intent is sufficiently clear from the language of the will, 
particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio 
recordings and the affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, 
if necessary, judicial enforcement. As to the claimant, Thomas 
Everett Lanham, decedent's intent is very clearly that claimant take 
by the will only one dollar ($1M0) and a bed and there is no lawful 
reason to frustrate decedent's intent. 
R. p. 45. 
Upon the Magistrate's ruling, plaintiff Thomas instructed his attorney, defendant Douglas 
Fleenor, to appeal the decision. Defendant Fleenor did so, but filed the notice of appeal late and, 
accordingly, the appeal was ultimately dismissed as dilatory by the Court of Appeals. See In the 
Matter of the Estate of Lanham, Idaho , 369 P.3d 307 (App. 2016). 
'Through clerical inadvertence, the Will, as Exhibit A to defense counsel Lundberg's affidavit 
(R. p.16), was not included in the clerk's record. For ease of reference, counsel's affidavit and Exhibit A 
(the Will) is attached hereto as Addendum A. An appropriate motion to augment will be made. 
2As used herein, the meaning of the term "residuary clause", is consistent with the definition in 
Black's Law Dictionary: "A testamentary clause that disposes of any estate property remaining after the 
satisfaction of specific bequests and devises". Id., Seventh Edition, p. 1311. 
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Plaintiff Thomas filed suit against defendant attorney alleging that as a proximate result of 
the failed appeal his entitlement as an intestate heir was lost. In summary judgment proceedings, the 
Complaint was dismissed. The district court ruled that, had there been a timely appeal, plaintiff 
Thomas would not have prevailed in the probate matter, i.e., the Will gave the personal 
representative a power of appointment, precluding an intestate distribution of the undevised real 
property. That is, ruled the Court, because a timely appeal would not have given the plaintiff the 
status of an intestate heir, plaintiff's claim for professional negligence lacked the element of 
proximate causation. 
Course of Proceedings Below:  
(1) Complaint: 
 The Complaint in this matter (R. p. 9) was filed on behalf of plaintiff 
Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham ("Keith") alleging professional negligence against 
attorney/defendant Douglas Fleenor by reason of a tardy notice of appeal. Although Keith was not 
a client of defendant Fleenor, he alleged that the defendant owed him a duty of care, as a non-client, 
based upon the factor test set forth in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884 
(2004), e.g., foreseeability, proximate causation, clear financial loss. Plaintiffs allege that as a 
proximate result of the late appeal their status as intestate heirs of certain real property was lost. 
Plaintiffs further allege that their intestate entitlement is based upon the failure of the Will to devise 
the real property and the absence of a residuary clause (R. pp. 10-11). 
(2) Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment: 
 Defendant's motion sought a dismissal of the Complaint based upon a 
purported power of appointment held by the personal representative which, argued defendant, 
precluded intestate succession of the undevised real property. That is, because the appeal would 
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have been without merit, defendant's late notice of appeal was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' 
lost heirship. Additionally, as to plaintiff Keith Lanham, defendant's motion sought the dismissal 
of his claim based upon the absence of an attorney/client relationship between defendant and plaintiff 
Keith. 
The plaintiffs filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment arguing that defendant's 
negligence precluded an appeal and was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' lost inheritance as 
undisputed intestate heirs. In the course of an order declining to adopt the parties' stipulation for a 
briefing schedule, the Court gave defendant the option to re-file his Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
as a Rule 56(c) summary judgment motion in view of the extraneous exhibits accompanying the 
motion. 
(3) Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment: Upon plaintiffs re-filing their partial 
motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion (R. p. 89), defendant filed his motion for summary 
judgment (R. p.109). Following hearing, the District Court granted defendant's motion, in part, by 
dismissing plaintiff Keith's complaint based upon his status as a non-client of defendant Fleenor (R. 
p. 174). 
As to the remaining cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court declined to rule 
until the entirety of the underlying probate file was entered into the record (R. p. 174) 
(4) Entry of Summary Judgment: Upon supplementation of the record as ordered, 
the Court denied plaintiff Thomas' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant 
attorney's motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff Thomas' complaint. 
Preliminary rulings: (a) Explicit in the district court's ruling is that where an 
estate is only partially devised and there is no residuary clause, the undevised property must descend 
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by intestate succession (R. pp. 254,258) 
(b) As a further preliminary matter, the Court had correctly opined that "the 
outcome of any hypothetical appeal was a legal issue to be determined by the Court as an issue of 
law" (R, p. 252). 
(c) The Court also correctly ruled that the decedent's disinheritance of 
Thomas and Keith "cannot operate to prevent [them as] heirs of law from taking under the statutory 
rules of inheritance when the decedent has died intestate as to any or all of his property", quoting 
Matter of Estate of Baxter, 827 P.2d 184, 186 (Okla. App. 1992) (R. p. 255; bracketed material 
explanatory) (R. p. 255) 
Gist of summary judgment: The district court rejected plaintiff's claimed 
status as that of an intestate heir, ruling that a timely appeal would have been decided adversely to 
plaintiff. This result, opined the Court, was based upon the conclusion that the "power of attorney" 
referenced in the Will was, in fact, a power of appointment as to the entirety of Gordon's estate 
assets, including undevised real property (R. p. 258). In turn, the Court held that the absence of this 
indispensable causal element, i.e., intestacy arising from undevised real property, rendered plaintiff's 
allegations of professional negligence defective. That is, because the Court saw the appeal as not 
meritorious, its late filing visited no financial loss on plaintiff Thomas, i.e., there was no proximate 
causation. 
As the district court opined: 
At the very end of the will, he [the testator Gordon] repeats: 
"I want to state in here again that the executor of my 
Will is Judd Max Lanham and I am giving him a 
Power of Attorney for full control now and even after 
I am dead. I want him to be able to distribute my 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5 
property and my personal effects as stated in my Last 
Will and Testament". 
This language shows the clear intent to create a general power of 
appointment and give his friend and cousin the power to dispose of 
the real estate . . . Use of the words "power of attorney" are 
simply a layman's miscues of a legal term of art. Giving Judd 
Lanham full control "even after I am dead" is sufficient. Gordon 
Lanham's intent was to create a power of appointment, so that Judd 
could distribute his assets after his death. The will was effective to 
dispose of the contested real estate through the power of appointment. 
R. pp. 257-258 (bracketed material explanatory). 
Notwithstanding the term "power of attorney", the Court concluded that this phrase in the 
Will, "when the will is read as a whole', unambiguously created a "power of appointment" in the 
executor Judd Lanham (R. p. 258). Accordingly, concluded the Court, the Will disposed of the 
entirety of the decedent's estate, and any appeal would have been unsuccessful in establishing an 
intestate heirship in plaintiff Thomas. 
Had the appeal in this case been timely filed, it would have been 
unsuccessful. Because it appears that in the absence of a successful 
appeal, plaintiff suffered no injury caused by the negligence, if any, 
of Defendant Fleenor, the case will be dismissed. 
R. p. 258 (emphasis added). 
Now this appeal by plaintiff Thomas. 
Statement of Facts:  
Preliminary note: 
 The statement of facts in this case has a variable scope depending 
upon whether the Will is seen as ambiguous or not. If not ambiguous, the Court is required to limit 
its focus to the "four corners of the document". If there is ambiguity, then the Court is entitled to 
consider extraneous facts in order to achieve clarity. See authorities cited below. The "statement 
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of facts" presented here covers both scenarios. 
Circumstances of the Will's authorship and its quirky provisions: This strange 
document was not prepared by an attorney nor was it executed in the conventional fashion. Rather, 
it was dictated into a machine over a period of six days by the decedent Gordon and then transcribed 
(by one Rebecca Clift; R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A). In addition to its murky dispositive 
provisions, the Will chronicles, inter alia, the current weather, a grandson's tonsillitis, the kindness 
of neighbors, and an uncle's death. 
Will dictated .................... November 18, 2010 through January 7, 2011 
Will transcribed ................ January 19, 2011 
Will executed .................... February 19, 2011 
R. p.16 Ex. A, Addendum A 
Gordon Lanham died on December 15, 2013 {R. p. 219). Plaintiff is not challenging the 
formalities of the Will and is not asserting the existence of incompetency or undue influence. 
References in the Will to real property in dispute: The subject real property, to 
which plaintiff claims intestate entitlement, consists of 200 acres in Gem County ("the Ranch") and 
47 acres in Valley County ("Big Creek"). This property is described in the Estate inventory of the 
Personal Representative (Judd Lanham) as follows: 
Ranch and Land at 3555 Butte Rd., Emmett, 
ID; Gem County Parcel #RP00418817 
45+ acres on Big Creek in Valley County 
R. p. 72 
At page 1 of the Will (R. p. 16, Ex. A, Addendum A): "I am going to make my friend and 
cousin Judd Max Lanham executor to my estate and give him Power of Attorney over all my 
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personal and real property". As to the property actually devised in the Will, its provisions effectively 
disinherited the testator's only children, plaintiff Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham, (R. p. 16 Ex. 
A, Addendum A, pp. 1, 2). 
The Will's reference the Big Creek property: The Will provides at page one: 
This is another day...it is November 19' and I want to state in here 
that the executor of my Will is Judd Max Lanham and I am giving 
him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after I am 
dead. I want him to be able to distribute my property and my personal 
effects in any way he sees fit and I will try and put all the wording 
about the personal effects. I also have a 47-acre of property in Big 
Creek Idaho, Valley county and I will try to describe about how I 
want that administered, etc. I am gonna stop now. 
R. p. 16, Will, Addendum A, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
And at the third page of the Will: "I just been doing a lot of thinking and I want to think 
about that 47 acres in Big Creek, Idaho, Plot 35. I am going to administer 1/2  to one person and 1/2  
to another" (R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A, p. 3). 
There is no further reference to the Big Creek property in the Will, including reference to the 
decedent's dispositive intentions thereto. 
The Will's reference to the Ranch property: The sole reference to the Ranch 
property in the Will is: "I have a ranch with 120 acres" (R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A, p. 1). The 
Will contains no other reference to this property, dispositive or otherwise. 
The Ranch property was properly included in the PR's Estate inventory (R. p. 72). However, 
approximately one month prior to his death in 2013, the decedent executed a "deed" to the Ranch to 
his grandson Joseph Lanham (R. p. 21). As reflected in the authorities cited below, this so-called deed 
was an ineffective instrument because, despite the language of conveyance, testator/grantor Gordon, 
in addition to reserving a life estate, reserved "an unrestricted power to convey during [his] lifetime, 
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which included] the power to sell, gift, mortgage, lease and otherwise dispose of the property and to 
retain the proceeds from the conveyance" (Id.). Because of Gordon's retained interest in the Ranch 
property, the deed to Joseph was an ineffective conveyance. Accordingly, the Personal Representative 
properly included the Ranch as part of the Estate inventory. A fair inference is that Gordon's 
attempted inter-vivos conveyance, although ineffective, was in lieu of a testamentary disposition of 
the Ranch property in the Will. That is, the failure of the decedent to devise the Ranch in the Will was 
in contemplation of this attempted conveyance by deed. 
Language in the Will which may inform (1) the meaning and the scope of the  
decedent's reference to "power of attorney" in the Will and (2) whether a "power of 
appointment" can be or should be included in a "power of attorney: 
Executor Judd Lanham's "power of attorney" was "for full control now and even after I am 
dead". The conventional power of attorney operates during the principal's life and terminates upon the 
principal's death. See Idaho Code § 15-12-110(1)(a). The phrase "for full control now", articulated 
in the Will (R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A) is consistent with the features of a garden-variety power of 
attorney, i.e., the "power" is immediately operative but does not survive death. 
The Will's provisions respecting Big Creek reflect three facts: (1) the decedent's repeated 
uncertainty as to who would receive this property: (2) the designated beneficiary of this property would 
be named by the decedent himself, i.e., an actual devise: and (3) the failure of the Will to devise the Big 
Creek property.  
Page 1 of the Will (R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A) references Big Creek: "I also have a 47-acre 
of property (sic) in Big Creek Idaho, Valley county and I will try to describe about how I want that 
administered, etc. I am gonna stop now." This provision is to the effect that, whether by power of 
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appointment or actual devise, the Will would, at some place thereafter, set forth the decedent's 
testamentary intent. 
Page 3 of the Will (R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A) corroborates the decedent's continuing 
uncertainty and makes clear that, at some point, he himself, not an appointee, would determine who 
would be the beneficiary of Big Creek. "I just been doing a lot of thinking and I want to think about 
that 47 acres in Big Creek, Idaho, Plot 35. I am going to administer 1/2  to one person and 1/2  to another" 
(emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the decedent's expressed intentions, the Will contains no provisions identifying 
the beneficiary or beneficiaries of Big Creek or how the decedent was going "to administer 1/2  to one 
person and 1/2  to another". The last sentence of the Will reminds us that the executor is to distribute the 
testator's estate "as stated in my last Will and Testament". The Will fails to devise of the Big Creek 
property notwithstanding the testator's expressed intention of what he was "going" to do. 
Extrinsic evidence:, In proceedings before the magistrate, the Personal Representative 
("Executor") Judd Lanham presented his affidavit in summary judgment proceedings respecting the 
intent of testator Gordon Lanham (referred to as "Tom"). In the event the Will is deemed "ambiguous", 
this affidavit testimony sheds light on the testator's intent (R. pp. 216 - 221). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL  
Whether the district court committed an error of law by (1) concurring with the Magistrate 
decision and ruling that the decision would be affirmed on appeal; and (2) opining and ruling that the 
Will, which lacked a residuary clause, contained a power of appointment arising from the testator' s 
reference to a "power of attorney" in the Will which, in turn, precluded intestate succession. 
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ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A recent Idaho Supreme Court decision articulated the standard of review in the summary 
judgment context: 
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the 
motion for summary judgment." Quemada v. Arizmendez (In re Estate 
of Ortega) 153 Idaho 609, 612, 288 P.3d 826, 829 (2012) (quoting 
Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 101, 218 P.3d 1150, 
1162 (2009)). Summary judgment is proper, "if the pleadings and 
admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Green v. Green, 161 Idaho 675, 389 P.3d 961, 964 (2017). 
As respects the existence or not of ambiguity in a will, the district court correctly defined the 
standard of review: "Whether a document is ambiguous is a question of law over which appellate 
courts exercise free review. Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 241, 254 P.3d 1231, 1237 (2011). R. p. 257 
POINTS OF LAW AND FACT WHICH ARE NOT IN DISPUTE 
 
(1) In the event of intestacy, plaintiff/client Thomas is an intestate heir. 
(2) Where there is a failure to perfect an appeal, determination of the merits of the appeal is 
within the exclusive province of the Court, not the jury: Citing Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600 
(Wash. 1985) and Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition, Vol 4, sec. 33.43 (p. 942), the District Court 
concluded: 
The treatise [Legal Malpractice] cites multiple cases from several 
jurisdictions. For example, the Washington Supreme Court held 
that for "cases involving an attorney's alleged failure to perfect an 
appeal" courts have consistently recognized that the determination 
of the success of the appeal is within the exclusive province of the 
court and not the jury. 
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R. p. 173 (explanatory material in brackets). 
(3) The Will does not devise the real property and there is no residuary clause: As opined by 
the District Court: 
For purposes of the issues presented here, the record reveals some 
uncontroverted facts. The decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham died, 
leaving two children, Thomas and Keith. At the time of his death he 
owned three parcels of real property. He left a will. The will is 
homemade. It is apparently a transcription of recorded statements by the 
Decedent. The will has no identifiable residuary clause as that term is 
generally understood. Nor does the will explicitly directly dispose of the 
real estate. In the will decedent directed at three places that his cousin 
Judd Max Lanham dispose of decedent's property. 
R. p. 254 
It is also undisputed that the Decedent left no surviving spouse. 
(4) Absent a residuary clause, the property undevised by the Will must pass according to the 
law of intestacy: In the absence of a specific devise of the property as well as the absence of a residuary 
clause, Idaho case law requires that this real property descend according to intestate succession, i.e., 
there is a partial intestacy arising from the Lanham Will: 
In other words if the will clearly discloses that the testator did not 
dispose of all of his property, particularly in the absence of a residuary 
clause, then the omitted property must descend according to the laws of 
succession. 
In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339 (1963). 
Defendant Fleenor acknowledged this point of law in his unsuccessful motion for summary 
judgment: "When a devise fails and the will lacks a residuary clause, the residue passes through 
intestate succession. In re Corwin's Estate . . " See Fleenor brief (R. p. 26), the executor's brief 
(R. p. 28) and Fleenor's reconsideration brief (R. p. 37) 
Plaintiff recognizes that the Courts "favor testacy rather than intestacy". In re Corwin's Estate, 
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86 Idaho at 5. Notwithstanding, a Court may not be allowed to speculate as to testamentary intent. 
However, in order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court 
is not permitted to place on the will any construction not expressed in it, 
and which is based upon supposition as to the intention of the testator in 
the disposition of his estate. 
Id., 86 Idaho at 5. 
There is not a hint in the Will as to whom the testator intended as beneficiary as to either Big 
Creek or the ranch property. In fact as to Big Creek, he expressed the desire to "think about" it (R. p. 
16, Ex. A, p. 3, Addendum A). A fair inference is that the Will does not reference the ranch because 
it was decedent's intention, as borne out later, to dispose of it by an attempted inter-vivos transaction. 
(5) In the absence of a residuary clause, a testator's disinheritance of heirs at law cannot thwart 
the laws of intestacy as to undevised property: A general principle of both American and British 
jurisprudence is that a testator can only alter the mandate of the intestacy laws by disposing of the 
property by will. That is, decedent's disinheritance of plaintiff Thomas does not impair his status as 
an intestate heir to the real property not disposed of by the Will. 
. . . Michigan has held that a testator could not limit or eliminate an 
heir from receiving that portion of an estate governed by the statute 
descent and distribution except by disposing of the property by will. 
Southgate v. Karp, 154 Mich. 697, 118 N.W. 600; In re McKay Estate, 
357 Mich. 447, 98 N.W.2d 604. 
In these cases, Michigan followed the general rule in American and 
British jurisprudence. Boisseau v. Aldridges, 5 Leigh 222, 32 Va. 222, 
27 Am Dec. 590; Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S.E. 672, 2 L.R.A. 
848; Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S.W. 639; Pickering v. Stamford, 
(1797), 3 Ves. Jun. 492 (30 Eng. Rep. 1121); Johnson v. Johnson, 4 
Beay. 318 (49 Eng. Rep. 361). See also Page on Wills (Lifetime ed.), § 
939, p. 857; 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1225, p. 1072; 57 Am. Jur § 1170. 
In the Estate of Brown, 106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960). 
The district court concurred, quoting Matter of Estate of Baxter, 827 P.2d 184 (Okla., 1992): 
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[A] disinheritance clause, no matter how broadly or strongly phrased, 
operates only to prevent a claimant from taking under the will itself, or 
to obviate the claim of pretermission, but does not and cannot operate to 
prevent heirs at law from taking under statutory rules of inheritance 
when the decedent has died intestate as to any or all of his property. 
Id., 827 P.2d at 186. (R. p. 255) 
And quoting a New York case, In re Bayle 's Estate, 113 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1952) 
In order to cut off the right of a distributee to inherit property, there must 
be a valid and legal bequest or devise to other persons. Mere words of 
disinheritance are insufficient to effectuate that purpose. 
Id., 113 N.YS.2d at 40. 
(6) The decedent's pre-death, attempted conveyance of the ranch property (R. p.21) did not 
remove the property from his estate because the decedent retained all ownership rights, including the 
right of sale and retention of the sale proceeds. 
 Garrett v. Garrett, 154 Idaho 788, 791, 302 P.3d 1061 
(2013). Hence, this property properly remained in the Estate inventory (R. p. 72). 
WHETHER SUBJECT TO THE "PLAIN MEANING RULE", WHETHER 
CLARIFIED BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, OR WHETHER CONTROLLED  
BY LEGAL STRICTURES, THE WILL FAILS TO DEVISE THE REAL PROPERTY, 
AND IT MUST PASS BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION.  
The following arguments support the conclusion that the Will did not include a cognizable 
power of appointment. Absent that power and absent a residuary clause, the real property must pass 
by intestate succession. 
(1) Plain meaning argument: 
 First, the Will fails to reference a "power of appointment" 
or equivalent language. Even assuming the "power of attorney" referenced in the Will is to be read 
as a "power of appointment", the Will fails to identify which property of the decedent is subject to the 
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power given explicit ownership issues and expressed testamentary uncertainty.' Absent such 
identification and absent actual reference to a "power of appointment", the Will does not create a power 
of appointment. 
Plaintiff concedes the correctness of the district court's comment that "no special or technical 
words" are required to create a power of appointment. However, the testator's usage of the term "power 
of attorney", a term having statutory specificity, hijacks any connotation that a power of appointment 
is intended. See Idaho Code § 15-12-101 et seq. 
(2) Judicial speculation resulting in dubious legal instruments:  The "power of attorney" 
referenced in the Will explicitly gives the executor, Judd Lanham, "full control now and even after I 
am dead", transforming the Will document into a simultaneous power of attorney. However, the district 
court also deemed the "power of attorney" to be a "power of appointment" which, by its terms ("full 
control now") is effective immediately, notwithstanding its placement in Gordon Lanham's "last will 
and testament". 
This judicial spin is problematic for three reasons: 
(a) According to the Uniform Power of Attorney Act "UPAA") (I.C. § 15-12-110(1)(a)), 
and unlike testator Lanham's power of attorney, a power of attorney must "terminate" upon the death 
of the principal. 
(b) The testator Lanham's testamentary "power of appointment", unlike its more 
conventional brethren, is purportedly effective immediately, not awaiting his death. 
3In reference to Big Creek, the testator "wants to think about" it. Referencing certain personal 
property items, it is not clear whether the testator is identifying them as other's property or in terms of 
who the beneficiary should be. 
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(c) Thirdly, Idaho law precludes a court from speculation as to testamentary intent in 
order to avoid intestacy: 
However, in order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court 
is not permitted to place on the will any construction not expressed in it, 
and which is based upon the supposition as to the intention of the 
testator in the disposition of his estate 
In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339 (1963) 
In seeking to avoid intestacy, the district court has created, by judicial fiat, documents which, 
in the eyes of the law, do not exist: (a) a power of attorney which survives the death of the principal 
is not recognized by the UPAA; and (b) a testamentary power of appointment which is immediately 
operative and which immediacy contravenes the inherent nature of a will, i.e., a will and any powers 
of appointment included therein are merely aspirational until the testator's death. 
(3) Ambiguity and admissibility of extrinsic evidence:  When a will contains the following 
provisions and omissions, a fair argument exists that, at the very least, an ambiguity is created as to the 
existence, or not, of a power of appointment: 
(a) The Will endows the personal representative with a "power of attorney" for present 
and post-death empowerment ("full control now and even after I am dead") without referencing the 
legal device commonly known as "power of appointment". The term "power of attorney" has statutory 
specificity, creating an issue whether a "power of appointment" has been created. 
(b) The will identifies two pieces of real property without designating them as subject 
to a power of appointment or, in equivalent terms, as subject to distribution by the personal 
representative. 
(c) As to one piece of property (Big Creek), the Will recites that the testator himself will 
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"administer '/2 to one person and 1/2  to another" (R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A). However, no devise 
is made in the Will due to testator's uncertainty, i.e., "I want to think about, etc" (R. p. 16 Ex. A, 
Addendum A) 
As the district court correctly observed, extrinsic evidence may be of service in clarifying 
testamentary ambiguities: 
If the language is ambiguous, interpretation of the will is a question of 
fact. The fact finder may resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve the 
ambiguity and find the intentions of the testator. Matter of Estate of 
Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 475, 700 P.2d 96, 97 (Ct. App. 1985). 
R. p. 257 
Symptomatic of the Will's ambiguity is the personal representative's motion for summary 
judgment which alleges, inconsistently, that the beneficiaries of the Estate are Lanham grandsons and 
whomsoever the personal representative distributes the property (R. p. 208). The Magistrate's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law fails to identify the Estate beneficiaries or recognize the personal 
representative's "power". 
Extrinsic evidence contravenes the existence of a power of appointment:  
The 120 acre ranch: The affidavit of the "executor" Judd Lanham (or "personal 
representative" as preferred by the Idaho Probate Code, I.C. § 15-3-101 et seq), provides insight into 
the intent of testator Lanham to which contravenes the existence of a "power of appointment". In short, 
he intended to dispose of the ranch by an inter-vivos transfer. That is, with respect to "the ranch with 
120 acres" referenced the Will (R. p.16), Judd Lanham testified that the testator intended to and did 
deed the ranch to a relative prior to his death: 
After his experience with Thomas Everett, he wanted to be sure that he 
could live at the ranch for the rest of his life knowing that Joe and his 
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wife would care for him and upon his death the ranch would be 
transferred, free and clear to his grandson, Joseph Lanham. A deed 
entitled Transfer on Death Deed was recorded to memorialize his intent, 
shortly before he passed away. 
R. p. 218 
The deed itself is part of this record. (R. p. 21).4 
 
The 47 acres in Valley County: Again, according to the affidavit of Judd Lanham, the 
testator did not intend to give him, as executor, a power of appointment. Rather, according to Judd, 
testator Lanham's testamentary intent, which was made known on March 14, 2011, after the Will was 
executed (February 19, 2011) was to devise this property to certain named relatives. 
According to Track #9 (the entry dated March 19, 2011) of the CD 
previously submitted to the Court, Tom wanted the Big Creek property 
to be distributed as follows: 
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres, etc. [intention follows] 
 
I believe that this is a specific instruction. 
R. p. 220 (bracketed material explanatory). 
Based on the foregoing, testator Lanham's testamentary intent had not fully evolved at the time 
he executed the Will on February 11, 2011. Accordingly, and unfortunately, his ultimate testamentary 
intent remained unarticulated with respect to both real properties. Judd's affidavit also makes clear that, 
whatever "power" Judd was given by the Will, this power was not unrestricted and, in fact, Judd's 
decisions were informed exclusively by the testator's post-Will, pre-death instructions (R.p. 220). 
Given the benefit of these extrinsic materials, the ambiguity created by reference to "power of 
4 
 However, as noted above, the ranch was retained in the estate inventory (R. p. 72) because the 
testator's retained fee simple interest in the property invalidated the deed. Garrett v. Garrett, 154 
Idaho at 791. 
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attorney" is clarified, i.e., the Will fails to include the testator's intended disposition of the real 
property. The ranch property was to be disposed of by deed, and the Big Creek property was subject 
to testamentary plans, i.e, "my plans are to leave that 27 acres", which were never formalized as part 
of a will. 
THE FAILURE TO TIMELY APPEAL THE MAGISTRATE 
DECISION PROXIMATELY RESULTED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
LOSS OF HIS STATUS AS AN INTESTATE HEIR.  
Gist of alleged malpractice: 
 The Lanham Will (R. p. 16 Ex. A, Addendum A) which lacked 
a residuary clause failed to devise two pieces of real property. Notwithstanding, the magistrate 
erroneously ruled that the Will bequeathed the testator's estate in its entirety. Defendant attorney 
appealed the magistrate decision but missed the appeal deadline by seven days. As a proximate result, 
plaintiff Thomas Lanham was prevented from reversing the magistrate decision by which reversal both 
plaintiffs would have acquired the status of intestate heirs to the decedent's real property. 
According to the leading treatise on legal malpractice, attorney errors in post-judgment and 
appellate matters make up a substantial portion of malpractice suits filed. 
Attorneys frequently have been sued concerning posttrial procedures or 
appeals. . . The nature of alleged errors is as varied as the posttrial 
procedures available to the client. These include failing to make 
posttrial motions; improperly made posttrial motions; advising against 
taking an appeal; failing to advise of an appeal; failing to take 
preliminary steps necessary to appeal, such as moving for a new trial; 
failing to file notice of appeal timely; failing to file required records, 
transcripts, and factual statements necessary to perfect the appeal; and 
negligence in presenting the client's intentions. 
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition (West), Mallen & Smith, Vol. 4, sec. 33:43, pp. 924, 925 {emphasis 
added), including seven pages of footnotes with citations. 
In Chicoine v. Bignall,122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992), the client stated a cause of action 
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against his attorney for filing an untimely motion for new trial. 
Dismissed appeal and proximate causation: 
 The Court of Appeals recently affirmed the 
district court's decision, sitting as an appellate court, that defendant Fleenor had failed to timely file an 
appeal from the magistrate decision. See In the Matter of the Estate of Lanham, Idaho 369 
P.3d 307 (App. 2016). That is, it is undisputed that defendant Fleenor filed an untimely notice of 
appeal. See Judgment ( R. p. 48) and Notice of Appeal ( R.p. 51). By the failed appeal, plaintiff lost 
his claim to being intestate beneficiary to the real property in the Lanham Estate (R. p. 75). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Proximate causation: 
 From one standpoint, this action is a relatively straight-forward case of 
professional negligence, i.e., failure to file a timely notice of appeal. However, .imbedded in the 
negligence analysis is the question whether a timely appeal would have reversed the magistrate 
decision. The law is clear that, for two reasons, a timely appeal would have reversed the magistrate and 
the real property would have passed to the plaintiffs by intestate succession: (1) the Will did not devise 
the real property; and (2) there was no residuary clause i.e., "a testamentary clause that disposes of any 
estate property remaining after the satisfaction of specific bequests and devises. 
Where a claim is based upon a late notice of appeal, it is incumbent upon the trial court to opine 
whether or not the appeal would have been successful. In determining that the appeal would not have 
been successful, the district court erroneously concluded that the Will clothed the personal 
representative with a "power of appointment". The district court reached this conclusion by inferring 
a "power of appointment" from the expressed "power of attorney" which, in turn, cured the perceived 
intestacy. That is, according to the district court, the plaintiff/client did not have the status of an 
intestate heir from the get-go, rendering the untimely appeal moot. 
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The district court's conclusion that the Will included a power of appointment is erroneous for 
several reasons: (1) the plain language of the Will; (2) the untenable instruments created by treating the 
Will's power of attorney as including a power of appointment; (3) in the event ambiguity is perceived 
by the Will's reference to "power of attorney", the intent of the testator is clarified by extrinsic 
evidence, i.e, the affidavit of Judd Lanham which references an omitted devise and the reliance of the 
testator on an inter-vivo s conveyance which foundered due to a defective deed. That is, the testator was 
not, in fact, relying on a so-called "power of appointment"; rather, he was relying on a pre-death 
conveyance by a defective deed and a testamentary devise which he failed to make. 
Finally, the district court improperly speculated that testator's reference in the Will to a "power 
of attorney" was intended to include a "power of appointment". Idaho common law makes it clear that, 
although the law disfavors intestacy, it is error for the court to engage in speculation in order to cure 
the intestacy. 
The plaintiff/appellant (client) respectfully requests that the summary judgment be vacated and 
the matter remanded for a trial on the merits. 
Submitted this 12th 
 day of March, 2018. 
Allen 13. Ellis 
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant Thomas E. Lanham 
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ADDENDUM A 
Last Will and Testament 
My name is Gordon Thomas Lanham at 3555 Butte Road, Emmett, Idaho 83617. 
My birthday is 7/29/1944. As of sound mind, I am recording my Last Will and 
Testament. This is November 16, 2010. 
November 18, Thursday, 2010: 1 had a wife and two sons and grandsons and a 
couple of great grandsons and great granddaughters and I want to make this clear what I 
am going to do for my estate. I am going to make my friend and cousin Judd Max 
Lanham executor to my estate and give him Power of Attorney over all my personal and 
real property. I am also going to clear what I am going to leave my son Thomas Everett 
Lanham and Keith Colby Lanham and my grandchildren. 
I have two sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby Lanham. I want to 
state in my Will what they receive. I have .6 living grandsons and two great 
grandchildren... one boy and one girl...Mason and MclCinley. I have a ranch with 120 
acres. I have two separate deeds, I have $50,000 mortgage on the deed on the house and 
34 acres to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. I have some equipment, some personal 
items, some furniture and some personal effects according. I have a little bit of livestock, 
a horse and some cattle. 
This is another day...it is November 19th 
 and I want to state in here that the 
executor of my Will is Judd MaxLanham and I am giving his a`Power of Attorney for 
full control now and even after I am dead. I want him to be able to distribute my property 
and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will try and put all the wording 
about the personal effects. I alto have a 47-acre of property in -Big-Creek Idaho, Valley 
county and I will try to describe about how I want that admhilatered, etc. I am gonna stop 
now. 
This is a new day. It's the 29Th 
 November, 2010. Thanksgiving is over and I just 
wanted to add to this program that my son, Thomas Everett Lanham, 48 years old, has 
already been given all he needs to have and that I am going to leave $1 more dollar 
against whatever is legal to him and then he is going to be on his own. As far as my son, 
Keith Colby Lanham, he is currently in jail. I will have to work on what I am going to do 
with the police process of what he can own, etc. What comes under his record. Anyway, 
that is all for now and I will start again later. 
It's a new day and it's snowing. It's 
 December 2010. It's the first snow out 
back. I am not really looking forward to it...but anyway, I want to go on about my son, 
Keith Colby Lanham and his wife, Amy Lanham, that I am going to try to write it down 
or leave it in this recording that, what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my 
estate I don't want him to be able to sell and profit off of his alcoholism or drugs ever 
since his car wreck he has been on pain pills and ever since his son rode in the rodeos and 
got himself into a domestic violence case and went to prison, now his father is in the 
same way. Anyway, I will going on in the next session about my grandchildren, his 
children will not receive anything either. I am not trying to be mean but I am still trying 
to deal with all the drugs and alcohol. I have drunk for 45 years and I know that the 
effects of alcohol are mind altering and the way that they think now is not good. 
Anyway, I will go for another session tomorrow. It's is snowing out and it gonna be a 
beautiful winter and Christmas. 
It's Thursday afternoon on the 9th 
 December, 2010.: All is well. I was just going 
to record in here that I need to do a lot of thinking about what I am going to do with my 
personal effects and property. I sold my steer and heifer at the sale and my grandson 
came down with tonsillitis so I am gonna have to baby sit him for a while it looks like. 
Anyway, I wanted to comment on all the furniture in this house. Some of it belongs to 
me and some of it belongs to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. The old Pine couch and 
two chairs furniture, dresser with a mirror and a stand up dresser in the bedroom belongs 
to her and a corner cabinet belongs to her and an old antique rocking chair she got from 
Nebraska belongs to her. The rest of the furniture was given to me by my Mother and my 
Father and the corner cabinet in the foyer, this big room out here where the heating stove 
is belongs to Linda or her son Todd and my Mother gave me a lot of this stuff but I 
haven't decided where to disperse of it lately. The old antique coffee grinder, lamp and 
radio... it's an antique radio that belongs to Linda but the lamp belongs to me and my 
Locust coffee table came from Glenn's Ferry - King Hill, Idaho belongs to me. The 
rungs and all the antique Navajo Indian rugs belong to me and I am gonna try and 
disburse of some of those before my passing. But anyway this is another day and another 
time. Catch ya later...bye 
Its Sunday Morning, 12th 
 December, 2010: The neighbor just came over and put 
some wood in for me I the stove...its foggy and pretty cold up here. I don't know what it 
is in the valley but...anyway, I wanted to add to the situation that a lot of the antiques 
that I have to be clarified as personal property and lots of them belonged to my...that my 
mother gave me, belonged to my sister Kathy and some of her family and she can 
disburse of them with help from my cousin Judd. The plates, the china plates, the coffee 
grinding machine, the tables and the sewing machines and the old antique kitchen stove 
and the old antique oak tables and etc., she can decide where she wants them to go or 
whatever. And I want...there is all kinds of books, etc. in the living room 
cabinet....some of those belong to Lizzy's mother and lots of them belonged to my Dad 
and they were all given to me as gifts and they can sort thru some of that stuff however 
they want. There is antique table and chairs, small set that was my Mother's. There is an 
antique rocker; I might have mentioned that, it belongs to Lizzy. There is an antique 
radio, And as far as my guns are concerned I am gonna have to try and decide on how 
that goes...there is a wooden bed in the big bedroom that my Dad had built at Cabin 
Creek, that belongs to my son, Keith. And the smaller one in the other bedroom belongs 
to my son, Tom, which my Dad built. Anyway, there is also some sand painting that 
belongs to Lizzy and I gotta $3,000 sheep head that Judd can hang up in his cabin if he 
wants to. And, there is all kinds of stuff that I'll discuss with him. But anyway, there is 
all kinds of stuff in my safe that will be his to disperse of how ever he wants. Catch ya 
later....bye. 
Well, it's the shortest day of the year tomorrow...it snowed 5 or 6 inches the last 
couple of days. I haven't talked into this very much. I just been doing a lot of thinking 
and I want to think about that 47 acres in Big Creek, Idaho, Plot 35. I am going to 
administer 1/2 to one person and Y2 to another. I am going to go over this message about 
my stuff that is in this safe. There is a whole bunch of pictures in there of all this 
furniture and household goods for the insurance companies and taxes and etc. I have 
always paid up. I owe $1,500 on that Linda Louise Andrews mortgage for the year 2010. 
She is supposed to send me a receipt that it is paid up from 2006 thru 2010. When I get 
that I'll put that in the safe. There is some cashiers checks, cash, and coins, in that safe. 
And an antique gun that is worth a lot of money...a 40-60 Winchester and a brand new 
replica. There is a 308 lever action rifle. There will be a22 marlin lever action rifle. A 
30-30, and old browning 5 shot automatic 12 gauge and there is about a $6,000 1933 
browning over and under silver engraved with a 4 digit serial number 9929. Anyway, it's 
the 19th 
 day of December 2010. 
It's a New Year...this is January 7, 2011: My uncle John died Tuesday, my Dad 
has been dead for 30 years, Anyway, I just wanted to say that I got a receipt in the mail 
for paying all the money owed on my $50,000 mortgage thru 2010. It is now 2;00 Friday 
the 7th 
 and I wanted to mention about my guns. I wanted to mention that they can be sold 
for enough money to pay part of the mortgage off and what have you. I have antique 6 or 
8 thousand dollar 1933 browning double trigger, silver engraved, over and under with a 4 
digit serial number. I also have an old 308 60 year old rifle with a scope. I have a 
antique 40-60 Winchester and a new replica copy. I have a browning 5 shut automatic 
that's a 1952 model. I have a 375 H and H magnum that belonged to my Father. I have a 
30-30 rifle. I also have a 454 Rueger Kruse' pistol. I have a 22 magnum pistol. I have a 
380 automatic pistol and I have a antique 40-60 Winchester that came from Vinegar 
Ridge in the back country off of Cabin Creek that could be worth as much as 8: or 10 
thousand dollars. 
(The above was transcribed on 1-19-11 by Rebecca Cliii.) 
I want to state in here again that the executor of my Will is Judd 
Max Lanham and Iiun giving'hinla,PowcfbrAttornel'for full control now and even 
after I am dead. I want him to be able to di 'tribute my property 4td lady peNonal 
as stated in my Last Will and Testament. 6,— ti,werl 
STATEMENT OF WITNESSES 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho that the person who 
signed or acknowledged this document is personally known to me (or proved to me on 
the basis of convincing evidence) to be the principal, that the principal signed or 
acknowledged this Last Will and Testament in my presence, that the principal appears to 
be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence, that I am not the person 
appointed as executor by this document,. 
PrintingItige4/4i P ant Same:: 
Date:~ rq-ii  DateL 
Address: i C 
370 
further declare under penalty of pe4iity.undertlie taws of Idaho that I am not 
related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, and, to the best of my knowledge, 
I am not entitled to any part of the estate of:the principal upon the death of the principal 
under a will)" w existing or by operation of.law. 
Signature: 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this 
 L  day of  , 2011, before me personally 
appeared Gordon ThOmas Lanham to me known (or proved to me on basis of satisfactory 
evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed to this instrument, and 
acknowledged that he/she executed it. I declare under penalty of perjury that the person 
who„ae.. a'rne is subscribed to this instrument appears to be of sound mind and under no 
diress aud or undue influence. 
Notary Public for Idaho;  
Residing in Eagle, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 
A. YE  
REBECCA J. CLIFT 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
